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INTRODUCTION
Religion plays a vital role in the daily lives of many prisoners. For
incarcerated persons, a connection to the divine can provide comfort dur-
ing periods of isolation from their family and community. From a policy
perspective, spiritual development and religious practice promote rehabili-
tation and reduce recidivism in inmates.1 While prisoners forfeit many of
their civil liberties, Congress has ensured that religious exercise is not
among them.2 As Congress enhanced religious freedom protections for
prisoners, prison facilities became increasingly concerned that prisoners
would feign religiosity to gain certain religious accommodations.3 To
counter this concern, prison facilities conditioned accommodations on the
sincerity of an inmate’s religious belief.4 Some facilities, however, insti-
tuted problematic methods for determining sincerity of religious belief,
such as requiring physical evidence of doctrinal adherence or removing
lapsing prisoners from religious accommodations.5
This Note discusses the problems of current methods for testing the
sincerity of religious belief in federally funded prisons and proposes a
method for standardizing sincerity testing. Passed in 2000, the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) protected the relig-
ious exercise of prisoners by holding religious exercise to the highest con-
stitutional standard in our courts: strict scrutiny.6 RLUIPA accorded
prisoners a means of relief if their religious exercise was not properly ac-
1. Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of
RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 511 (2005) (“Religious obser-
vance by prisoners . . . cut recidivism rates by two-thirds . . . .”); see also Religion in Prisons,
PEW FORUM, (March 22, 2012), available at http://www.pewforum.org/2012/03/22/prison-
chaplains-exec/ (“Nearly three-quarters of the chaplains (73%) . . . say they consider access to
religion-related programs in prison to be ‘absolutely critical’ to successful rehabilitation of
inmates.”).
2. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 52 (10th Cir. 2014) (discussing Congress’s moti-
vations in passing the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act).
3. See Lizette Alvarez, You Don’t Have to be Jewish to Love a Kosher Prison Meal, N.Y.
TIMES, (Jan. 20, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/us/you-dont-have-
to-be-jewish-to-love-a-kosher-prison-meal.html (“Florida is now under a court order to begin
serving kosher food to eligible inmates, a routine and court-tested practice in most states. But
state prison officials expressed alarm recently over the surge in prisoners, many of them gentiles,
who have stated an interest in going kosher.”); Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 494 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“Prior to 2010, Muslim inmates at [Red Onion State Prison (“ROSP”)] simply had to sign up
to participate in Ramadan. In 2009, approximately half of the inmate population signed up.
ROSP staff later determined that a significant number of the participating inmates were not, in
fact, practicing Muslims. As a result, ROSP devised a new eligibility policy for 2010: in addition
to signing up, inmates had to provide some physical indicia of Islamic faith, such as a Quran,
Kufi, prayer rug, or written religious material obtained from the prison Chaplain’s office.”).
4. See generally Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 54; Wall, 741 F.3d at 499; Moussazadeh v. Tex.
Dep’t of Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 2012).
5. Wall, 741 F.3d at 494; Moussazadeh, 703 F.3d at 792.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
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commodated.7 If a prisoner demonstrated that a policy substantially bur-
dened his religious exercise, a facility could only continue engaging in that
practice if it demonstrated a compelling state interest.8
After RLUIPA’s passage, prisons feared that heightened protections
for religious exercise would result in a flood of frivolous claims for relig-
ious accommodations arising out of a desire for preferential treatment,
rather than out of a sincere need for the accommodation.9 RLUIPA pro-
hibits prisons and courts from granting religious accommodations only to
practices that are “central to” or “compelled by” a religion.10 In other
words, RLUIPA does not differentiate between accommodations for prac-
tices mandated by religions, such as Kosher meals, and those encouraged
by religions, such as supplementary fasts. By preventing the inquiry into
centrality, RLUIPA provides prisoners with a platform to request accom-
modation for any religious exercise.11 However, RLUIPA does permit in-
quiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed belief.12 If an inmate is
found to be insincere, a facility is not required to provide religious accom-
modations.13 The permissibility of testing sincerity, however, created con-
fusion in its application for both prison facilities and lower courts.14 For
example, some prison facilities removed prisoners from Kosher food pro-
grams after finding that the prisoners ate nonkosher food from the com-
missary.15 Others required physical evidence of religious adherence before
finding sincerity, such as possession of a Quran, prayer rug, or written
religious materials from a chaplain’s office.16 While appellate courts often
invalidated such policies, the more pressing worry is that prisons across the
country are using unconstitutional methods of sincerity testing to deter-
mine belonging in particular religious groups and consequently, entitle-
ment to religious accommodations. The result: policies that fail to
accommodate for imperfect religious adherence end up violating
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. The term “compelling state interest” is defined in Part I.B.4,
infra.
9. See Alvarez, supra note 3.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
11. See id.
12. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n. 13 (2005) (“Although RLUIPA bars in-
quiry into whether a particular belief or practice is “central” to a prisoner’s religion . . . the Act
does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religiosity.”).
13. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 521. (Protection does not extend – whether under the First
Amendment or RLUIPA – to ‘so-called religions which . . . are obviously shams and absurdities
and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting
Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 1974)).
14. See Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 492 (4th Cir. 2014) (prison policy attempting to
distinguish sincerity was upheld at district court level, but overturned on appeal).
15. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781, 781 (5th Cir. 2012).
16. Wall, 741 F.3d at 494.
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RLUIPA’s constitutional protections and do not get resolved until the ap-
pellate level.
This Note argues that prison facilities are engaging in sincerity test-
ing in a manner that violates constitutional free exercise protections. Yet,
these violations occur as a result of the difficulty in applying the RLUIPA
standard rather than out of an intentional desire to evade constitutional
protections. This Note ultimately proposes a practical solution: a three-
step test to determine the sincerity of a prisoner’s religious belief,
modeled, in part, after the test developed for conscientious objectors to
military service.17 Part I explains the history of RLUIPA and how prison-
ers may bring religious exercise claims under RLUIPA. Part II explains
RLUIPA’s burdensome standard in adjudicating sincerity of religious be-
liefs by examining prisons’ problematic methods of testing sincerity, dis-
trict court confusion in adjudication RLUIPA claims, and how appellate
court decisions frequently overturn district court decisions and invalidate
unconstitutional prison policies.
Part III proposes a three-part test that standardizes the sincerity in-
quiry and aids prisoners, prison facilities, and courts in the litigation of
RLUIPA claims. This Note offers a simple and practical approach for what
prisons and courts should consider when inquiring into the sincerity of a
prisoner’s religious beliefs by adapting the test used to measure the sincer-
ity of religious belief for conscientious objector in the military context to
RLUIPA claims.18 This solution conducts a meaningful sincerity inquiry
that distinguishes between the genuine practitioner and feigning believer
while relieving judges from the precarious position of being arbiters of
religious doctrine. The three-part inquiry also maintains a degree of flexi-
bility that continues to provide prison facilities with the right to constitu-
tionally rebut a prisoner’s declaration of sincerity.
Ideally, this Note hopes for a directive from Congress to clarify the
scope of permissible sincerity testing under RLUIPA in prison facilities. In
the absence of such Congressional action, however, this Note aims to re-
solve the issue through clarifying and standardizing the confines of the
sincerity inquiry: first through prison facilities and ultimately, through the
courts. As courts begin setting the guidelines of the sincerity inquiry, pris-
ons will reform their methods to conform to each district or circuit court’s
requirement.
17. See Kevin L. Brady, Religious Sincerity and Imperfection: Can Lapsing Prisoners Recover
under RFRA and RLUIPA?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431, 1433 (2011). The adaptation of the
conscientious objector test to the RLUIPA sincerity inquiry was first proposed in Brady’s article.
This Note expands on and modifies the test proposed by this article.
18. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965); see also Witmer v. United
States, 348 U.S. 375, 376 (1955).
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I. PROTECTING RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
IN PRISON
A. History of Free Exercise Jurisprudence
RLUIPA was passed against the backdrop of a series of cases and
statutes ensuring the free exercise of religion.19 In 1963, in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a claim for religious ac-
commodation under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.20
The Court held that laws substantially burdening religion could not be
upheld unless the government could demonstrate that the law advanced a
compelling government interest and was the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest.21 However, thirty years later, the Supreme Court
abandoned Sherbert’s strong constitutional protections for the free exercise
of religion.22 In Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, two employees lost
their jobs as a result of using peyote, a required part of their Native Ameri-
can religion.23 When the employees filed for government unemployment
benefits, their applications were denied because they had been fired for
work-related misconduct.24 They sued the State of Oregon, citing viola-
tions of the Free Exercise Clause.25 The Supreme Court, however, upheld
Oregon’s state law denying the plaintiffs’ unemployment benefits.26 The
Court held that the laws need only meet a rational basis review.27 Smith
overruled Sherbert’s compelling interest test and declared that the Free Ex-
ercise Clause “does not exempt religious persons from the dictates of neu-
tral laws of general applicability.”28
In 1987, in Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court addressed the Free
Exercise Clause in the prison context. The Court held “when a prison
19. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 398 (1963) (holding that unemployment
benefits could not be denied to claimant who refused employment because it would require her
to work on Saturday, in conflict with her religions beliefs); Religious Freedom and Restoration
Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-bb (1993) (restoring the compelling interest test set forth in
Sherbert and “guarantee[ing] its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substan-
tially burdened” by government).
20. 374 U.S. at 403.
21. Id. at 406–07. This standard is generally referred to as “strict scrutiny.”
22. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 873
(1990).
23. Id. at 874.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005) (citing Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at
878–82).
27. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 508–09 (“[T]he Smith Court announced a new rule apply-
ing mere rational basis scrutiny in the usual case where religious exercise was burdened as a result
of a neutral and generally applicable law.”).
28. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 52 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Emp’t Div., 494 U.S.
at 872).
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regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”29 In
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, the Court applied the Turner test and gave
prison great deference in formulating policies to accommodate religious
prisoners’ requests.30 Although Turner and O’Lone “were not significant
retreats in prisoner rights protection,” they clarified “what numerous
courts were already doing.”31
Worried that there was insufficient protection for the free exercise of
religion, Congress sought to restore Sherbert’s compelling-interest test.32 In
1993, Congress nearly unanimously passed the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act (RFRA).33 RFRA prohibited the government from
“substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the government can
prove that the burden furthers a “compelling government interest” and is
“the least restrictive means” of achieving that interest.34 RFRA applied to
both state and federal government officials.35 Congress had temporarily
succeeded in restoring a strict scrutiny standard for free exercise claims.
RFRA’s success, however, was short lived. Less than four years after
Congress passed RFRA, the statute was successfully challenged as an un-
constitutional exercise of congressional power.36 In City of Boerne v. Flores,
the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as unconstitutional,37 holding
that RFRA exceeded Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment due to its lack of a commerce clause underpinning or spending
clause limitation.38 RFRA was invalidated only as applied to the states,
however, and continues to be applied to the federal government—includ-
ing federal prisons.39
29. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
30. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
31. Daniel J. Solove, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the
Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459, 470 (1996).
32. Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 475 (D. Ariz. 1995) (“Congress specifically
stated that the purpose of the RFRA ‘is to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.’”) (internal citations omitted).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
34. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714–15 (2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (“the
Act’s mandate applies to any ‘branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other
person acting under color of law) of the United States,’ as well as to any ‘State, or . . . subdivision
of a State.’”).
36. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
37. Id.
38. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2; see also Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 513 n. 50 (“RFRA
continues to apply against the federal government and provide a cause of action for federal pris-
oners against the federal government. Moreover, Section 7 of RLUIPA amended RFRA so that
the scope of ‘religious exercise’ protected by RLUIPA is the same as that protected by RFRA.”).
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In 2000, Congress enacted RLUIPA, this time invoking its federal
authority under the Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause.40
RLUIPA reinstated RFRA’s balancing test in two contexts: land use and
prisons.41 Section 3 of RLUIPA pertaining to prison policies, states:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the relig-
ious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institu-
tion . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposi-
tion of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.42
RLUIPA applied to any prison facility that received federal financial
assistance.43 In 2005, the Supreme Court declared RLUIPA a constitu-
tional exercise of Congressional power in Cutter v. Wilkinson.44 RLUIPA
aimed to restore free exercise protections to pre-Smith jurisprudence and
uphold prisoners’ religious free exercise.45
B. RLUIPA’s Added Protection: Bringing an RLUIPA Claim
RLUIPA’s attempt to protect religious exercise in the prison context
succeeded more than any of Congress’s previously enacted statutes.46 Since
RLUIPA’s passing, there has been a “significant increase” in free exercise
claims brought by inmates.47 Under RLUIPA, more prisoners have pre-
vailed on free exercise claims than any other statute or Supreme Court
standard.48
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715.
41. Id. at 715.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006). This section also applied to cases where the “substantial
burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign na-
tions, among the several states, or with Indian Tribes.” Id.
43. Id. at § 2000cc-1(b)(1); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 732.
44. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720–21.
45. James D. Nelson, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 VA. L. REV. 2053,
2066 (2009) (“RLUIPA is the most recent attempt to protect religious liberty through codifica-
tion of a heightened standard of review.”).
46. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2063. (“In the last twenty years prisoners have not been
successful in advancing constitutional free exercise claims under Turner. Likewise, prisoners were
not successful under RFRA’s codified heightened scrutiny.”).
47. Id. at 2067.
48. See Nelson, supra note 45, at 2108 (referring to the hard-look model of some courts,
Nelson notes that “[b]y isolating the imposition on religious practice for burdens analysis, aban-
doning the requirement of outright coercion, and replacing a searching centrality requirement
with a cursory sincerity inquiry, courts have allowed a greater number of prisoners to make out a
prima facie case for accommodation under RLUIPA.”).
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To raise an RLUIPA claim, a prisoner must show three elements.49
First, he must demonstrate that a prison policy “interferes with his ‘relig-
ious exercise.’”50 Second, he must demonstrate that his religious beliefs are
sincere.51 Third, he must prove that the prison policy “substantially bur-
dens” the practice of his religion.52 After making a prima facie claim for an
RLUIPA violation, the burden shifts to the government to show that the
policy used is the “least restrictive means” of advancing a “compelling
government interest.”53 If the government fails to meet its burden, the
prisoner gets “any appropriate relief” and attorney’s fees.54 This often re-
sults in the prisoner being exempt from the challenged policy or receiving
his requested religious accommodation.
1. RLUIPA’s Broad Definition of Religious Exercise
A prisoner’s first burden under RLUIPA is to demonstrate that his
substantially burdened exercise was religious in nature.55 Unlike previous
statutes, which omitted a definition for “religious exercise,”56 Congress
took care to define “religious exercise” in RLUIPA.57 Although RLUIPA
distinguishes between a “religious belief” and a “way of life based on
purely secular considerations,”58 protecting only the former, RLUIPA
greatly expands the definition of religious exercise. Under RLUIPA, relig-
ious exercise is defined to include “any exercise of religion whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”59 Thus, RLUIPA
protects any and all prisoners’ claims to religious exercises, regardless of the
importance of a practice to a particular religion.60
49. Id. at 2067.
50. Id.; see generally Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 513–14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(e))
(stating that prior to bringing an RLUIPA claim, the prisoner has to show that he has exhausted
any available administrative remedies).
51. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2067.
52. Id.
53. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b).
54. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 514.
55. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2108.
56. Cf. Religious Freedom and Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (failing to define
“religious exercise”).
57. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 517 (explaining that RFRA did not define “religious exer-
cise,” but that Congress specified RLUIPA’s definition of “religious exercise” would also apply
to RFRA, which had essentially left the term undefined).
58. Id. at 519–520 (RLUIPA required that the act be religiously motivated, and distin-
guished between a “religious belief” and a “way of life . . . based on purely secular
considerations.”).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2004).
60. Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n., The Law of Prison: IV. in the Belly of the Whale: Religious Practice
in Prison, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1891, 1895 n. 25 (2002). (“RFRA defined religious exercise as
“the exercise of religion under the First Amendment. Many courts limited the “substantial bur-
den” requirement of RFRA to regulation that “significantly inhibit[s] or constrain[s]” a “cen-
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The effect of RLUIPA’s broad protections is most easily demon-
strated by examining a hypothetical. Many Muslim prisoners request relig-
ious accommodations during the month of Ramadan in the form of meals
at dawn and sunset and exemption from eating throughout the day.61 Fast-
ing during Ramadan from sunrise to sunset is an undisputed central tenet
of Islam.62 In contrast, fasting on Mondays and Thursdays is not a central
tenet of Islam, but is a recommended additional activity for Muslim practi-
tioners who are able to, and desire to, fast for additional days. After
RLUIPA, prisoners were able to bring legitimate claims for accommoda-
tions to fast on Mondays and Thursdays. More importantly, prison facili-
ties could not make a constitutional distinction between the two requests.
If a prisoner prevails on all other requirements of an RLUIPA claim,
RLUIPA mandates that he be equally likely to prevail on a prima facie
claim for Ramadan fasts as he is to prevail on an accommodation for Mon-
day and Thursday fasts.63
2. Shifting the Inquiry from Centrality to Sincerity
RLUIPA permits prisoners to bring claims pertaining to any religious
exercise and prohibits inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is
“central to a prisoner’s religion.”64 RLUIPA’s ban on inquiring into cen-
trality of belief was a major victory for prisoners’ free exercise claims.65
Prior to RLUIPA’s enactment, the centrality inquiry was closely tied
with demonstrating that a policy poses a substantial burden.66 Judges often
tral tenet of a prisoner’s individual beliefs” or denies opportunities to engage in activities
“fundamental to a prisoner’s religion,” Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir.
1995), or that prevents a “mandated” practice, Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir.
1995). “Substantial burden” was understood similarly prior to RFRA.”). See also Gaubatz, supra
note 1, at 532 (explaining that the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits and some
district courts imposed a centrality requirement in order for religious practice to be protected
under RFRA).
61. See Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 494 (4th Cir. 2014).
62. Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 206 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The Ramadan fast occupies a
special place as one of the central tenets of Islam. Prescribed in the Muslim holy scripture of the
Qur’an, the month-long holiday is celebrated by Muslims around the world as a time of great
religious and cultural significance.”).
63. However, it is likely that a prison facility would prevail at the compelling-need in-
quiry on granting the Monday/Thursday fast accommodation.
64. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n. 13 (2005).
65. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2077. (“The drafters intended RLUIPA to remove the many
‘frivolous or arbitrary rules’ that restrict the religious practice of prisoners in ‘egregious and
unnecessary ways.’ They observed that the centrality inquiry placed an obstacle in the way of
claimants attempting to secure an accommodation under both Sherbert and RFRA, and they
specifically sought to eliminate that barrier.”).
66. Solove, supra note 31, at 476. (“[C]ourts applying RFRA have held that the burden
must interfere with a ‘central tenet’ of the religion or with a practice ‘mandated’ by the religion.
The central tenet test, however, understands religion in a very narrow manner, leading many
courts applying RFRA to dismiss any practice not deemed absolutely obligatory.”).
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decided whether a prison policy substantially burdens an inmate’s religious
exercise by inquiring into whether a practice was central to, or compelled
by, a religion.67 If a court found a practice was central to or compelled by a
religion, an inmate could easily show that his religious exercise was sub-
stantially burdened.68 Jewish prisoners can easily demonstrate that denial of
Kosher food substantially burdens their religious exercise because Kosher
meals are a central tenet of Judaism. The centrality requirement, however,
was an “enormous hurdle” for many prisoners.69 Supplementary religious
practices often went unprotected. For instance, practitioners of religions
with fewer compelled practices, such as followers of Native American reli-
gions, found it more difficult to prove that a prison policy substantially
burdened their religion.70 RLUIPA crystallized the prohibition on the
centrality inquiry, and its effects were significant.71 While under RFRA
prisoners only had a nine percent success rate, they found that RLUIPA
provided a greater chance of success.72
RLUIPA only requires that a prisoner demonstrate that his religious
exercise is sincere.73 Maintaining the permissibility of the sincerity inquiry
is a crucial factor because the “government need only accommodate the
exercise of actual religious convictions.”74 The First Amendment and
RLUIPA do not extend protections to sham religions “whose members
are patently devoid of religious sincerity.”75 Because RLUIPA prohibits
prison facilities from denying prisoner’s accommodations based on
whether the requested accommodation is central to a prisoner’s professed
belief, prison facilities resorted to conducting sincerity tests in order to
67. See Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrections, 65 F.3d 489, 491–92 (6th Cir.
1995) (holding that a religious practice must be “essential” or “fundamental” to be protected);
Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that “the burden must be substantial
and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine.”).
68. Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 479 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding that prisoner met
his burden of proving that his attempts to maintain a Kosher diet, keep his hair at a certain
length, and wear a headcovering of a particular color were central tenets of his faith and that
prison policies substantially burdened his religious belief).
69. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2077.
70. Id. at 2064.
71. The distinction between centrality and sincerity and the bar on inquiring into central-
ity has been around since 1944. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (“If we try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the dispute
from the very considerations which in common experience provide its most reliable answer.”).
However, because there was no direct prohibition as clear as it was stated in RLUIPA, courts
operating under RFRA and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) maintained the ability to use
the centrality inquiry to deny prisoners’ rights claims.
72. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 534.
73. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n. 13 (2005).
74. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 521.
75. Id.
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differentiate between prisoners who are entitled to religious accommoda-
tions from those seeking to game the system.
3. Substantial Burden
The third element a prisoner must prove to prevail on an RLUIPA
claim is that the prison policy substantially burdened his religious exer-
cise.76 This is the threshold inquiry in considering the merit of a prisoner’s
claim.”77 If a policy is found to substantially burden a religious practice,
the burden then shifts to the government to prove that the policy advances
a compelling government interest.78 Congress did not define “substantial
burden” within the text of RLUIPA.79 However, “substantial burden” is
commonly used in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court held in Sherbert v. Verner “that a substantial burden exists when gov-
ernment actions or qualifications placed on benefits and privileges have a
‘tendency to inhibit’ religious exercise.”80 The Court went on to provide
an example of a substantial burden, explaining that one exists when a per-
son is required to “choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion . . . on the other.”81 Although courts differ on
defining substantial burden, courts generally understand a substantial bur-
den exists when a policy puts “pressure on individuals to modify their
religious behavior or prevent[s] them from engaging in religious conduct
in a way that is greater than a mere inconvenience.”82
As explained above, the substantial burden inquiry was complicated
by RLUIPA’s prohibition on inquiring into centrality.83 As courts re-
viewed prison policies for testing inmates’ sincerity, they found it difficult
to determine the existence of a substantial burden without inquiring into
the centrality of religious belief.84
4. Compelling Interest
After a prisoner demonstrates that a prison policy substantially bur-
dens his religious exercise, the burden shifts to the government or prison
facility to defend the policy.85 If a facility intends to maintain its existing
76. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2067.
77. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 514.
78. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2067.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2006). The term “substantial burden” is left undefined in the
“Definitions” section.
80. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 515.
81. Id. at 515–16.
82. Id. at 534. See also Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2007).
83. See supra Part I.B.2.
84. Courts responded to RLUIPA’s prohibition on inquiring into centrality in one of two
ways. These responses are discussed in Part II.D-E, infra.
85. Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 514.
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policy, it must demonstrate that the policy furthers a compelling govern-
ment interest and is the least restrictive means to achieve that interest.86
This shift in the burden of proof distinguishes RLUIPA from prior free
exercise jurisprudence by upholding prisoners’ free exercise challenges to
strict scrutiny.87 After RLUIPA, it no longer sufficed for a facility to claim
a “legitimate governmental interest,” rather, prison facilities must assert a
“compelling governmental interest”—a distinction that makes it easier for
prisoners to prevail on free exercise claims.88
Compelling government interests in the RLUIPA context frequently
include a prison’s safety and security interests.89 In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the
Supreme Court emphasized that RLUIPA does not override an institu-
tion’s safety and security interests,90 stating “We have no cause to believe
that RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way, with
particular sensitivity to security concerns.”91 Lower courts have followed
the Supreme Court’s directive and given great deference to prison admin-
istrators’ expertise in determining a compelling governmental interest.92 In
fact, many prison facilities prevail by citing security concerns.93 After a
prison facility presents evidence of a compelling government need, courts
weigh the facility’s interest in the policy against the substantial burden in
order to determine whether the accommodation should be granted.94
II. RLUIPA: THE PROBLEM
A. Why Test Sincerity?
Religious accommodations in prison are desirable. They often afford
prisoners better food, more flexible sleeping schedules, extended time
outside their cells, and more opportunities to congregate with fellow prac-
titioners. Providing religious accommodations, however, can also be
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 543.
89. See generally Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (“Lawmakers supporting
RLUIPA were mindful of the urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institu-
tions and anticipated that courts would apply the Act’s standard with due deference to prison
administrators’ experience and expertise.”).
90. Id. at 722.
91. Id. at 721–22 (“While the Act adopts a ‘compelling governmental interest’ standard,
§ 2000cc-1(a), ‘[c]ontext matters’ in the application of that standard.”) (citation omitted).
92. See generally Nelson, supra note 45, at 2080–84 (discussing Sixth Circuit and Eighth
Circuit cases in which courts have deferred to the judgment of prison officials when determining
whether a compelling government interest exists).
93. See, e.g., Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 939 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
prohibition on access to a sweat lodge for prisoners of the Native American faith due to security
concerns was not a violation of RLUIPA because it was in furtherance of a compelling govern-
ment interest).
94. See id.
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costly. Prison facilities are concerned about the cost of providing kosher
meals, unfairly advantaging practitioners of certain religions, fostering feel-
ings of jealousy between inmates, or overburdening personnel. Yet, the
Constitution mandates that prison facilities grant some religious accom-
modations to inmates.95 To minimize the cost of providing these accom-
modations, prison facilities have an interest in granting accommodations to
as few inmates as possible.
One of the most efficient ways a prison can allocate minimal relig-
ious accommodations is by limiting accommodations to practices that are
central to or compelled by a religion.96 However, that strategy is expressly
prohibited by RLUIPA.97 Theoretically, after RLUIPA, an inmate could
ask for any accommodation stemming from a sincere religious exercise.98
RLUIPA did, however, permit prison facilities to condition accommoda-
tions on the sincerity of an inmate’s professed belief, and as a result, sincer-
ity testing has become an important way to distinguish between genuine
believers and feigning practitioners.
Consider the following scenario based on current events in Florida
State prisons:99 Prisoner A is a very sincere prisoner. He was born Jewish,
and has no reason not to receive Kosher food. He lapses a few times and
buys non-Kosher food from the commissary. The prison facility then de-
termines that he is no longer sincere in his belief and stops providing him
with Kosher meals. Prisoner B feigns sincerity because he wants the bet-
ter-tasting and more expensive Kosher food offered by the facility. He
lapses and buys non-Kosher food from the commissary, not out of weak-
ness in adhering to religious doctrine, but out of a lack of conviction in his
professed belief. The prison determines he is insincere in his belief and
prisoner B stops receiving Kosher meals. Sincerity testing, if properly con-
ducted, can be an effective means for a facility to deny accommodations to
insincere inmates. It can also, however, negatively impact sincere prisoners
by requiring perfection in religious adherence.
B. Sincerity Testing: A Problematic Alternative
The Supreme Court has favored an inquiry into the sincerity of re-
ligious beliefs, rather than the inquiry into the centrality of religious doc-
trine, in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The central purpose of the Establishment Clause is to ensure
95. U.S. CONST. amend I.
96. Solove, supra note 31, at 476. (The central tenet test “understands religion in a very
narrow manner” and can “dismiss any practice not deemed absolutely obligatory.”).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000).
98. See Gaubatz, supra note 1, at 518, 530; Alvarez, supra note 3; see also Harv. L. Rev.
Ass’n, supra note 60 at 1895 (stating that “under RLUIPA, the threshold appears to be only
whether the beliefs are ‘sincere’ and ‘religious,’ not whether they are ‘essential’ or ‘central.’”).
99. Alvarez, supra note 3 (discussing gentile inmates in Florida who want Kosher meals,
which cost four times as much as standard meals).
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“government neutrality in matters of religion.”100 The Clause stands for
the proposition “that when government activities touch on the religious
sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and
neutral in primary impact.”101 If courts are permitted to inquire into the
centrality of religious doctrine, judges risk violating the Establishment
Clause by involving courts in the religious sphere. However, RLUIPA’s
prohibition on inquiring into centrality failed to anticipate prison facilities’
difficulties in legitimately determining sincerity of religious belief. Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court did not provide any guidelines for prison facili-
ties seeking to test the sincerity of inmates requesting religious
accommodations. In fact, in Cutter v. Wilkinson, Justice Ginsberg presumed
that courts would succeed in properly adhering to RLUIPA’s text and give
prison administrators a great amount of deference.102 In rejecting prisons’
concerns that RLUIPA would result in an increasing number of frivolous
claims, Justice Ginsberg stated that the Supreme Court had faith in lower
courts’ ability to properly adjudicate RLUIPA claims and give due defer-
ence to prison administrators’ experience.103 This level of deference meant
that changes in policy to accommodate RLUIPA happened at the prison
level, rather than as a mandate from the courts.104 Without the necessary
guidance from Congress or the courts on how to conduct sincerity tests,
determining sincerity became a complicated process that often resulted in
prison facilities conducting unconstitutional inquiries.
Determining sincerity of religious belief is a difficult task to under-
take for both a prison facility and a court for a variety of reasons. First, the
degree of sincerity of religious belief can be impossible to factually test
without risking violating the Establishment Clause: “Faith is Faith because
it cannot be demonstrated. A degree of doubt is therefore always possi-
ble.”105 Second, judges making sincerity determinations or chaplains de-
termining whether an inmate belongs in a certain religious group can be
100. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449–50 (1971) (citing U.S.C.A. CONST.
amend I) (“And as a general matter it is surely true that the Establishment Clause prohibits
government from abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or
on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization.”).
101. Id.
102. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 710 (2005) (“Lawmakers supporting RLUIPA
were mindful of the urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions and
anticipated that courts would apply the Act’s standard with due deference to prison administra-
tors’ experience and expertise.”).
103. Id. (“There is no reason to believe that RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropri-
ately balanced way, with particular sensitivity to security concerns.”).
104. Alvarez, supra note 3, at 1895. (“Regardless of the formal level of scrutiny, however,
the deference that courts accord prison administrators means that significant changes in policies
tend to come from prisons, not from courts.”).
105. Brady, supra note 17, at 1451 (citing John T. Noonan Jr, How Sincere Do You Have to
Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 713, 718 (1988).
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affected by their own doctrinal commandments.106 Therefore, a possibility
of bias always exists. Third, testing the sincerity of a prisoner’s religious
belief can unfairly disadvantage the prisoner. Courts often readily doubt
the sincerity of some prisoners’ claims, presuming that prisoners have
strong incentives to invent religious burdens in their quest for special treat-
ment.107 Lastly, sincerity testing burdens religious practitioners by creating
an almost impossible burden of proof.108 Prisoners must maintain unwa-
vering religious adherence because lapses in adherence are considered evi-
dence of insincerity.
C. Prison Facilities’ Problematic Methods of Sincerity Testing
Sincerity testing in prisons is generally a two-prong inquiry.109 First,
an inmate requests the accommodation by filling out a questionnaire or
form demonstrating that he belongs to a particular faith group and needs
the requested accommodation.110 After receiving the requested accommo-
dation, a prisoner’s behavior is monitored by the chaplain or other prison
personnel to ensure that they are acting in accordance with their professed
beliefs.111 If they are deemed insincere, a prisoner may face repercussions,
including removal from the requested accommodation.112
In many prison facilities, sincerity of religious belief is determined by
having chaplains monitor the prisoners’ adherence to their religions.113
Lapsing prisoners, or those determined to be misusing an accommodation,
face removal from the accommodations. For example, New York State
prisons permit prisoners to wear certain religious headcoverings such as a
Kufi, Yarmulke, Tsalot-Kob, Fez, and Khimar.114 To determine whether
or not an inmate is sincere, a chaplain of the inmate’s faith must determine
whether an inmate’s practice and the “head-covering itself is ‘legiti-
mate.’”115 If there is reason to believe that an inmate is wearing a religious
106. Id.
107. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2064.
108. See id. at 2064–65.
109. Although prison facilities differ in their manner of determining religious belonging
and accommodations, this note will look to the New York State Prison system as a source for
how state prisons determine religious belonging and adjudicate accommodations because it is
generally regarded as a more progressive state prison system.
110. See STATE OF NY DEP’T OF CORR. AND CMTY. SUPERVISION, DIRECTIVE
NO.4202, RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS AND PRACTICES 1, 5 (July 24, 2014), available at http://
www.doccs.ny.gov/directives/4202.pdf. Some prisons also place limits on the number of times
you can change your religion. For example, New York allows inmates to change their religion
once a year. Id.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., id. at 9.
113. See, e.g., id. at 9.
114. See id. at 8.
115. Id. at 8.
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headcovering inappropriately, a facility chaplain will be asked to investi-
gate the matter further.116 If the inmate is not wearing the headcovering in
a manner “consistent with his or her documented religion,” then he or she
is found to be wearing it inappropriately, and the privileges may be re-
voked.117 The problem with this form of sincerity testing is that it places
chaplains in the position of determining religious belonging. If a chaplain
finds an inmate to be sincere, the inmate will continue to receive the ac-
commodation. If a chaplain finds an inmate to be insincere, his access to
the accommodation may be revoked. This is a problematic practice be-
cause it presumes that chaplains are able to determine sincerity for all sects
of a particular religion. For minority religions and sects, this method of
sincerity testing can be especially disadvantageous. While state prisons pro-
vide Chaplains for Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, they often do not have
chaplains for religions such as Buddhism118 or all sects of a particular relig-
ion in every prison facility. This results in sincerity determinations being
conducting by chaplains from different sects or religions.
Other prison facilities determine sincerity by looking to legal re-
quirements within the religion. In Benning v. Georgia, prison administrators
denied a self-declared Jewish inmate, Benning, the right to grow earlocks
after determining that Benning was not sincere in his Jewish belief.119 As
proof of insincerity, prison administrators argued that when Benning ini-
tially came to the prison he testified he was not Jewish, his parents were
both Episcopalian, and he did not go through the formal conversion pro-
cess.120 The district court overturned the prison’s classification and found
Benning to be sincere in his belief.121 Nevertheless, Benning’s case high-
lights the extent of the various prison policies’ problems. This particular
policy violates both the text of RLUIPA and the Establishment Clause’s
prohibition on government involvement in religious affairs. The prison
policy exceeded RLUIPA’s permissible method of testing Benning’s sin-
cere belief in Judaism, and instead, evaluated the religious legitimacy of his
claim under Jewish ecclesiastical laws.122
Other states conduct sincerity testing in a variety of ways. Red On-
ion State Prison (“ROSP”) in Pound, Virginia, attempted to administer a
sincerity test to address the problem discussed above.123 Their policy,
which prison administrators thought would be successful, was struck down
116. Id. at 8 (“The inmate shall be permitted to wear the head covering until the investiga-
tion is completed.”).
117. Id. at 8.
118. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 319 (1972) (per curiam).




123. Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 494 (4th Cir. 2014).
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as unconstitutional by the Fourth Circuit.124 ROSP had a Ramadan meals
program that provided Muslim inmates with special meals before sunrise
and after sunset.125 To participate in the program, Muslim inmates simply
had to sign up, but the ease of the registration process resulted in approxi-
mately half of the inmate population signing up for the program.126 ROSP
staff later determined that most of the participants were not practicing
Muslims and devised a new policy in 2010.127 If a prisoner wanted to
participate in Ramadan after 2010, the facility required that he possess a
Quran, a prayer rug, or some other indication of his Islamic faith,128 re-
gardless of whether the prisoner observes his faith in other ways. If they
did not have the materials or refused to acquire them, they were found to
be insincere and denied participation in the program.129 Although this
policy was struck down at the by the Fourth Circuit, it demonstrates the
difficulty prison administrators face in allocating accommodations.130
Other facilities administer tests that exclude lapsing prisoners from
receiving their requested accommodations.131 Texas prison systems also
engage in this type of sincerity testing. In Moussazadeh v. Texas Dep’t, a
prison denied an inmate kosher food after finding that he purchased non-
kosher food from the commissary.132
These various methods for determining sincerity exemplify the prob-
lem with sincerity testing. Without a uniform test to employ, prison facili-
ties are left to create their own assortment of tests that are often ineffective
or based on arbitrary distinctions about different religious practices, such as
an inmate’s consistency in adhering to rigid religious doctrines. In addi-
tion, these varying tests, employed without uniform guidelines, create un-
certainty as courts are forced to evaluate prisons’ tests on a case-by-case
basis to determine their constitutionality.
124. Id. at 501–02.





130. Id. at 502.
131. Some prisons have sought to establish a four strikes rule, permitting prisoners to lapse
up to four times before they are removed from an accommodation. Courts have not yet ruled on
the constitutionality of the four strikes rule. E.g., Kuperman v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, No.
06-CV-420-JL, 2009 WL 4042760, at *5–6 (D.N.H. Nov. 20, 2009) (“For imperfect but none-
theless sincere believers who happen to stray from their religious diets four times over the course
of two years (i.e., once every six months), the policy could impose a heavy burden indeed,
resulting in at least a one-month suspension of the religious diet and thus forcing the inmate to
choose between his religious scruples and his nutritional needs.”).
132. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 2012), as
corrected (Feb. 20, 2013).
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D. District Courts Confusion in Adjudicating Sincerity of Religious
Belief under RLUIPA
District courts appear equally confused by RLUIPA’s prohibition on
inquiring into the centrality of religious belief. After RLUIPA, courts be-
came uncertain on how to assess the substantial burden inquiry without
taking into account the centrality of a prisoner’s religious practice. The
difficulty of conducting a meaningful sincerity inquiry resulted in many
courts adopting one of two approaches.133 In the first approach, courts
conduct a centrality inquiry to determine whether a prisoner’s religious
exercise is substantially burdened.134 In the second approach, courts refrain
from evaluating sincerity almost entirely and essentially give prisoners a
“free pass” in demonstrating their prima facie RLUIPA claim.135
Courts continuing to conduct the centrality inquiry find it easier to
find the existence of a substantial burden.136 The less central a practice is to
a religion, the less of a burden a prisoner faces if his requested accommo-
dation is denied. In McFaul v. Valenzuela, a prisoner was denied his request
to wear a religious medallion in Celtic Druid ceremonies.137 The court
determined that wearing the medallion was not central to his belief, and
therefore denial of the medallion did not substantially burden the pris-
oner’s religious exercise.138 Although the court discussed sincerity of relig-
ious belief, a sincerity inquiry was replaced with a true centrality test.
Rather than evaluating whether the prisoner truly held his religious beliefs
in requesting the medallion, the court measured the necessity of the me-
dallion to Celtic Druids.139
Other courts attempt to remain true to RLUIPA’s text and only
conduct a sincerity inquiry. However, courts that take this approach fre-
quently permit prisoners to prevail on establishing their prima facie
RLUIPA claim without a legitimate inquiry into the sincerity of the pris-
oner’s belief.140 In their attempt to refrain from passing judgment on
whether a practice is a central tenet of the prisoner’s professed belief, these
133. These two approaches are adapted from Nelson’s two models of review: the deferen-
tial model and the hard look model. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2068.
134. See Nelson, supra note 45, at 2071 (referencing “The Deferential Model”).
135. See id. at 2092 (referencing “The Hard Look Model”).
136. See Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 501 (4th Cir. 2014).
137. McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Nevertheless, his silence
regarding the doctrines of the religion prevents him from showing that the burdens on his relig-
ious exercise are substantial.”).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Kroger v. Bryan 523 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the prison facility’s
testimony that the prisoner was insincere in his belief by providing chaplain testimony to the
contrary and presuming the prisoner’s sincerity).
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courts have abstained from questioning sincerity altogether.141 By allowing
prisoners to prevail more easily on establishing a prima facie RLUIPA
claim, the burden shifts to the prison to demonstrate why the policy fur-
thers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means
of achieving that interest.142 Consequently, determinations of whether a
prison policy substantially burdens an inmate’s free exercise of religion are
determined at the compelling need inquiry. The result is that these courts
applied strict scrutiny with less stringency than the standard usually re-
quired.143 Although this approach allows prisoners to prevail more easily
on their RLUIPA claims, it fails to adhere to RLUIPA’s text.144 Further-
more, as prisoners increasingly prevail under RLUIPA, greater numbers of
prisoners may be encouraged to bring RLUIPA claims, resulting in poten-
tially unmanageable amounts of litigation.
E. The Appellate Standard of Administering RLUIPA
As outlined above, in cases where prisoners’ sincerity is disputed, ap-
pellate court decisions frequently overturn findings of insincerity and de-
clare prison policies unconstitutional.145 In Moussazadeh, the Fifth Circuit
stated that the sincerity inquiry must be handled with a “light touch or
judicial shyness.”146 The court held that the sincerity inquiry, at its core,
was a credibility inquiry that should not constantly be questioned.147 In-
stead, the court stated, “sincerity is generally presumed or easily estab-
lished.”148 While the Fifth Circuit did not give prison administrators a
directive to formulate sincerity tests, it did provide loose guidelines for
prison facilities to adopt.149 The court stated that the sincerity inquiry is
made by looking to the “words and actions of the inmate,” with the im-
portant question being what the prisoner “claimed was important to
him.”150 Actions include, among others, whether the prisoner purchased
non-kosher food from the commissary, whether the prisoner exhausted his
administrative remedies, and whether the prisoner filed grievances after his
141. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2096–97. (“The result of this substitution under the hard
look model has been the elimination of a perennial hurdle to religious claimants in prison, and
the application of a sincerity inquiry that has amounted to little more than a rubber stamp.”).
142. Id. at 2067.
143. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2055.
144. See generally id. (arguing that more prisoners have prevailed under RLUIPA and
RLUIPA cases have increased drastically since its passage).
145. See supra, Part II.C.
146. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 2012), 703
F.3d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 2012), as corrected (Feb. 20, 2013) (quoting A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v.
Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 262 (5th Cir. 2010).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 791.
149. See id.
150. Id. (quoting McAlister v. Livingston, 348 F. App’x 923, 935 (5th Cir. 2009)).
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requested accommodation was denied.151 However, the court noted that
eating non-Kosher food is not per se evidence of insincerity, stating, “A
showing of sincerity does not necessarily require strict doctrinal adherence
to standards created by organized religious hierarchies.”152
Other circuits have followed suit and approached the sincerity in-
quiry in a similar manner. The Tenth Circuit stated that the sincerity in-
quiry is “limited to asking whether a claimant is seeking to perpetrate a
fraud on the court.”153 Again, the court translated the sincerity inquiry
into a credibility assessment. If the prisoner “actually holds the beliefs he
claims to hold,” he was found to be sincere, regardless of whether or not
the belief is logical.154 The Tenth Circuit went even further in directing
prisons to refrain from assessing the sacredness of a prisoner’s belief. In
highlighting the risks of violating the Establishment Clause, the court
stated, “separating the sacred from the secular can be a tricky business,
especially for a civil court whose warrant does not extend to matters
divine.”155
Some circuits have also placed strict limitations on the types of
sincerity testing a prison facility could permissibly conduct. The Fourth
Circuit in Wall v. Wade acknowledged that prisons may conduct sincerity
testing, but denied the prison facility’s policy of requiring physical items of
proof as evidence of a prisoner’s sincerity.156 The circuit court stated that
it exceeds a prison’s authority to decide which religious relics are suffi-
ciently important to gauge faith,157 and found that such a policy would be
“arbitrary or irrational.”158
III. STANDARDIZING THE SINCERITY INQUIRY USING
THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TEST
The problem of testing sincerity has resulted in a variety of strict and
arbitrary methods of testing. In reviewing prison policies, courts have ap-
proached sincerity testing by either conducting the equivalent of a central-
ity inquiry or by making it easy for prisoners to prevail on prima facie
RLUIPA claims.159
Courts conducting the equivalent of a centrality inquiry are in viola-
tion of RLUIPA’s text, which expressly prohibits judges from passing
151. Id. at 791–92.
152. Id. at 791.
153. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014).
154. Id. at 54–55.
155. Id. at 54.
156. Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 499–500 (4th Cir. 2014).
157. Id. at 499–500 (“Thus, the fact that Wall did not have, for example, a prayer rug in his
possession is not a sufficiently reliable indicator of whether he is a practicing Muslim.”).
158. Id. at 500.
159. See infra Part II.D-E.
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judgments on whether a practice is central to a religion.160 These courts
also risk violating free exercise jurisprudence by placing judges in the posi-
tion of being arbiters of religious doctrine. Courts adopting the second
view, permitting prisoners to easily make prima facie claims for accommo-
dation and shifting the burden of persuasion to the government, seek to
remain true to the text of RLUIPA. This approach, however, reduces the
sincerity inquiry to “little more than a rubber stamp.”161 Although this
model succeeds in permitting prisoners to prevail more easily on their
RLUIPA claims,162 it is likely to be challenged as more prisoners raise
RLUIPA claims.163
This Note proposes a third alternative: a standardized sincerity in-
quiry for courts to utilize in reviewing prison policies that will also act as a
directive to prison administrators when formulating effective and constitu-
tional sincerity tests. This standardized inquiry combines factors relied on
in the context of conscientious objectors from military service with appel-
late RLUIPA jurisprudence.
A. The Conscientious Objector Test
Courts’ reluctance to formulate a definitive test for sincerity in the
context of RLUIPA stands in contradiction to prior Supreme Court juris-
prudence in determining sincerity of religious belief. In the 1970s, courts
readily involved themselves in the process of testing the sincerity of relig-
ious beliefs in the context of conscientious objectors from the armed
forces.164 Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act
exempted from military service anyone “who, by reason of religious train-
ing and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form.”165 In granting such exemptions, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Seeger, held that the “test of belief ‘in a relation to a Supreme
Being’ is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief
in God.”166
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2006); see supra Part II.
161. Nelson, supra note 45, at 2092–93.
162. See Nelson, supra note 45, at 2053–54. There has been a drastic increase in the litiga-
tion of RLUIPA claims. This increase, however, has yet to be empirically analyzed. I predict
courts will be forced to standardize their inquiry due to the sheer number of RLUIPA claims
being brought forth. This standardization will assist in accurately determining a method of differ-
entiating between sincere and insincere practitioners, rather than shifting the inquiry to the com-
pelling need test.
163. See Nelson, supra note 45, at 2099 (stating that “[u]nder the hard look model, how-
ever, courts are again employing a series of doctrines, not typically found in the accommodation
context, that have raised the bar as to what counts as a compelling state interest.”).
164. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S.
375 (1955); Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
165. 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 456 (2012).
166. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–66.
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To prevail on a § 6(j) claim, a claimant must make a short statement
showing that he is: (1) conscientiously opposed to war; (2) his opposition is
based on religious belief; and (3) his objection is sincere.167 To make this
showing, a registrant fills out a questionnaire in which he states his relig-
ious belief and cites evidence “such as prior expression of his views” to
demonstrate sincerity.168 A military review board then decides whether
the registrant’s beliefs are sincerely held.169 If they are found to be sincere,
he is classified as a conscientious objector. If he is found to be insincere, he
is denied the 6(j) exemption. The registrant may appeal a finding of insin-
cerity to an appeal board and subsequently appear before an officer where
he may present more evidence of his sincerity.170
If the matter of a registrant’s sincerity is appealed to a court, the
court can then consider several factors when determining the sincerity of
the registrant’s belief and overturn a board’s classification if it has “no basis
in fact.”171 Although courts have differed on the degree of importance of
certain factors, an aggregation of Supreme Court and appellate court deci-
sions indicates that courts take into consideration various combinations of
the following factors:
Consistency of belief;172
Delay in asserting conscientious objector status;173
Objector’s testimony before the review board;174
167. Clay, 403 U.S. at 700 (“In applying these tests, the Selective Service System must be
concerned with the registrant as an individual, not with its own interpretation of the dogma of
the religious sect, if any, to which he may belong.”).
168. Witmer, 348 U.S. at 376.
169. Id. at 377.
170. Id. (“If the local Board denies the claim, the registrant has a right of appeal to the
Appeal Board. That Board, before reaching a final decision, refers the registrant’s file to the
Department of Justice for ‘inquiry and hearing.’ As the first step in this auxiliary procedure, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation investigates the registrant’s claim and refers its report to a hearing
officer of the Department of Justice. The registrant may then appear before this officer to present
evidence and witnesses in his behalf. After this, the hearing officer makes a report to his superiors
in the Department of Justice, suggesting a disposition of the case. The Department, after review-
ing the registrant’s file, the FBI report and the report of the hearing officer, writes a short
recommendation, stating its reasons and whether it has concurred in or overruled the suggestion
of the hearing officer. This recommendation of the Department of Justice is transmitted to the
Appeal Board and placed in the registrant’s file . . . . The Appeal Board, then, on the basis of the
registrant’s full file before it, comes to its conclusion, which, in the usual case, is the final deter-
mination of the Selective Service System.”).
171. Id. at 381.
172. Id. at 382–383.
173. Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 703 (1971) (“The Department of Justice was
wrong in advising the Board in terms of a purported rule of law that it should disregard this
finding simply because of the circumstances and timing of the petitioner’s claim.”).
174. Witmer, 348 U.S. at 383.
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Religious leader testimony;175
The strength of the registrant’s statement of religious belief;176
The Supreme Court in Witmer v. U.S. held that “the ultimate ques-
tion in conscientious objector cases is the sincerity of the registrant in ob-
jecting, on religious grounds, to participation in war in any form.”177 In
Witmer, the defendant was convicted of refusing induction into the
army.178 In determining whether Witmer should be exempted from ser-
vice, the Court relied on the consistency of conduct and the consistency of
his statements claiming exemption.179
However, prior to delving into the sincerity inquiry, the Witmer
Court established a presumption of sincerity where there were no facts that
readily required inferences to the contrary.180 The Court then examined
whether facts required defeating the presumption of sincerity. In Witmer’s
case, the Court found that the presumption prevailed because the regis-
trant’s demeanor did not appear shifty or evasive when he first made his
declaration.181 After finding that Witmer stated his belief with apparent
sincerity, the Court then examined objective facts presented to the review
board to evaluate his sincerity of belief.182 These included, among other
facts, looking to Witmer’s consistency of belief.183
The Court found Witmer to be insincere in his § 6(j) claim due to
his inconsistent statements.184 The Court determined that inconsistency is
found if a registrant’s views had fluctuated: if at times the registrant had
claimed a religious exemption and at other times, denied belonging to the
religious group, based on whichever exemption was most advantageous.185
In a prior application to the board for classification as a farmer, Witmer
swore that a ministerial classification did not apply to him.186 Yet, in his
175. Brady, supra note 17, at 1453.
176. Id. at 1454.
177. Witmer, 348 U.S. at 381.
178. Id. at 376.
179. Id. at 382–83.
180. Id. at 382. (“In short, the nature of a registrant’s prima facie case determines the type
of evidence needed to rebut his claim. If the issue is the nature of his activities, as in Dickinson,
the evidence providing ‘basis in fact’ must tend to show that his activities are other than as stated.
If, as here, the issue is the registrant’s sincerity and good faith belief, then there must be some
inference of insincerity or bad faith.”).
181. Id.
182. Witmer, 348 U.S. at 382.
183. Id. at 383. (“There are other indications which, while possibly insignificant standing
alone, in this context help support the finding of insincerity. Among these is petitioner’s failure
to adduce evidence of any prior expression of his allegedly deeply felt religious convictions
against participation in war.”).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 378–379.
186. Id.
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§ 6(j) conscientious objector application, he asserted his ministerial be-
liefs.187 The Court found that the inconsistent statements “cast considera-
ble doubt on the sincerity of petitioner’s claims.”188
In reviewing the sincerity of registrants’ conscientious objector appli-
cations, courts have also noted several factors that may not be considered.
Courts are expressly prohibited from concluding insincerity based on
whether or not an applicant’s conduct adheres to religious doctrine.189 For
example, “the government cannot prove that a Mormon’s belief in the
Bible is insincere by demonstrating that she drinks alcohol.”190 In re-
fraining from inquiring into the extent to which a claimant adheres to the
teachings of his religion, courts refrain from violating the Establishment
Clause.191 This prohibition also acknowledges that people have lapses in
adherence to doctrinal commandments without necessarily being insincere
in their beliefs.192 Court have also declared that a registrant cannot be de-
clared insincere solely due to the circumstances and timing of his claim.193
If a registrant raises a § 6(j) conscientious objector claim immediately
before he is to be drafted, the timing of the claim cannot be exclusive
evidence of religious insincerity.194
B. Standardizing the Sincerity Inquiry: Adapting the
Conscientious Objector Test
To improve the method of evaluating sincerity, this section proposes
a three-step test that adapts factors from the conscientious objector test to
create a practical and administrable inquiry into RLUIPA claims. Although
sincerity testing is inevitably a fact-specific inquiry conducted on a case-
by-case basis, this three-step inquiry is an easily administrable process that
courts should employ when evaluating sincerity. This test understands that
the sincerity inquiry should be nothing more than a finding that what a
prisoner says is what in fact he claims he says. By limiting the court’s de-
termination of sincerity to a credibility inquiry, courts will remain faithful
to the text of RLUIPA by refraining from entangling judges in the intrica-
cies of religious doctrine. At the same time, courts will be able to differen-
tiate between the feigning practitioner and the true believer.
187. Witmer, 348 U.S.. at 379.
188. Id. at 382–83.
189. United States v Rutherford, 437 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1972).
190. Brady, supra note 17, at 1454.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
192. Id.
193. Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 703 (1971).
194. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 396 (2955). See also Cohen v. Laird, 439 F.2d
866, 868 (4th Cir. 1971) (“While we recognize that such timing alone would not bar a sincere,
deeply held conscientious objector claim if such belief crystallized due to the immediate prospect
of combat duty in Vietnam . . . .”).
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Step I of the test proposes that courts adopt a rebuttable presumption
of sincerity when a prisoner makes a request for an accommodation.195
This presumption is established only after a prisoner establishes a nexus
between his religious belief and the requested accommodation. Step II
permits prisons to refute the presumption by inquiring into the consis-
tency of a prisoner’s behavior, with the caveat that the individual must be
given a chance to demonstrate his sincerity prior to being removed from
an accommodation. Step III outlines factors for courts to consider in
resolving the disputed sincerity by evaluating the credibility of the pris-
oner’s professed belief under a Totality of the Circumstances (“TOC”) test.
Adapting factors from the conscientious objector test, courts are permitted
to question the consistency of a prisoner’s behavior, but must refrain from
inquiring into the extent to which a prisoner adheres to religious doctrine,
resolving disputed facts in favor of sincerity.
1. Rebuttable Presumption of Sincerity of Religious Belief
As outlined in Part II.C, prisoners can request religious accommoda-
tions in most prison facilities by filing a form declaring their religion and
requesting a particular accommodation.196 To prevail on their request for a
religious accommodation a prisoner must make a short statement showing:
(1) the request for a particular accommodation; (2) that the accommoda-
tion is based on a religious belief; and (3) that their belief is sincere.197
After this showing is made, the presumption of sincerity should be estab-
lished. These three steps, together, place the burden on the prisoner to
establish a nexus between his requested accommodation and his sincere
religious belief.
A prisoner can successfully satisfy these three steps in a variety of
ways. The prisoner can fulfill this requirement by providing doctrinal
proof of the need of his religious accommodation, a facility chaplain’s tes-
timony, another religious leader’s testimony, or a statement explaining his
understanding of his religion’s endorsement of a particular practice. This
195. The rebuttable presumption was first proposed in Kevin L. Brady’s article, Religious
Sincerity and Imperfection: Can Lapsing Prisoners Recover Under RFRA and RLUIPA?, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1431, 1455 (2011). Brady adapted the idea of the rebuttable presumption of sincerity from
some courts’ presumption of sincerity in the conscription context. In particular, Brady focused
on the Second Circuit’s holding that a “registrant’s signed statement of belief and testimony
before the review board are prima facie evidence of sincerity.” Id. at 1454.
196. See MICH. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, POLICY DIRECTIVE, 5.03.150 (July 2013), avail-
able at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_150_429021_7.pdf (“A pris-
oner may eat from a Vegan menu only with approval of the Special Activities Coordinator.
Approval shall be granted only if it is necessary to the practice of the prisoner’s designated relig-
ion, including the prisoner’s sincerely held religious beliefs. To request approval, the prisoner
must submit a written request to the Warden or designee, who shall obtain information regard-
ing the prisoner’s request and religious beliefs prior to referring the request to the Special Activi-
ties Coordinator.”).
197. Adapted from Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 700 (1971).
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step of the inquiry should do little more than demonstrate that a prisoner’s
requested accommodation is linked to a sincere religious belief. It should
not require a prisoner to demonstrate that a practice is mandated by his
religion.198
It should be noted that not all prisoners are members of a doctrinal
religion and cannot easily provide doctrinal proof of a religion. For lesser-
known religions whose structures may be unfamiliar to the courts, prison-
ers can demonstrate a nexus between their religious belief and their re-
quested accommodation through a personal statement explaining the need
for the accommodation in order for the individual to practice their religion
freely.
When a prisoner files a form requesting an accommodation and
meets the requirements outlined above, this should be prima facie evi-
dence of sincerity sufficient to establish the presumption.199 In the con-
scription context, courts accepted statements and testimony before a
military draft board as evidence of sincerity. Relative to conscientious ob-
jectors, prisoners have weaker incentives to feign sincerity.200 Perceptions
that religious accommodations are always desirable can be misguided, and
strict religious adherence to gain such accommodations is difficult to
maintain. For example, while prison officials may believe that prisoners are
feigning religiosity to take advantage of kosher food programs—in many
states, Kosher meals are not necessarily better tasting. In Michigan, Kosher
food is prepared in special kitchens separate from the prison facility, so
inmates that request Kosher meals eat frozen food.201
There are many benefits to establishing a presumption of sincerity in
the prison context. The rebuttable presumption creates a structure through
which to standardize the sincerity inquiry. It places the initial burden of
providing evidence of religious adherence and the need for the accommo-
dation on the prisoner. If a prison facility has reason to doubt a prisoner’s
sincerity, they may refute the presumption with the requisite evidence.
This presumption of sincerity also adheres to the Fifth and Tenth Circuit’s
approach to RLUIPA jurisprudence by approaching the sincerity inquiry
with a “light touch” or “judicial shyness.”202 By creating a presumption of
sincerity, courts are presented with a structure through which to evaluate a
prisoner’s RLUIPA claims.
198. If the burden on establishing a nexus between his requested accommodation and relig-
ion required a prisoner to demonstrate centrality of religious belief, the first step of the test
would violate 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
199. See Brady, supra note 17, at 1455.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1456.
202. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781, 790–92 (5th Cir. 2012), as
corrected (Feb. 20, 2013); see also Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014).
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2. Rebutting the Presumption of Sincerity
After a prisoner makes a showing of sincerity, prison officials may
refute the presumption with affirmative evidence of his insincerity. The
Witmer Court emphasized the importance of a claimant’s initial statement,
stating, “In short, the nature of a registrant’s prima facie case determines
the type of evidence needed to rebut his claim. If the issue is the nature of
his activities, as in Dickinson, the evidence providing ‘basis in fact’ must
tend to show that his activities are other than as stated. If, as here, the issue
is the registrant’s sincerity and good faith belief, then there must be some
inference of insincerity or bad faith.”203 A facility may challenge the con-
sistency of a prisoner’s statements in a variety of ways. Examples include:
presenting chaplain testimony challenging the sincerity of the prisoner’s
beliefs or other prison personnel testimony refuting a prisoner’s professed
sincerity.
Prison chaplains often provide religious materials to inmates and
know which prisoners have requested Bibles or other religious items.204 A
chaplain can refute a prisoner’s assertion that he attends a religious service
or needs a certain religious item. Prisons are in a better position than the
courts to refute a prisoner’s sincerity by bringing forth the necessary evi-
dence because prison personnel interact with the individual on a daily ba-
sis. Federal prisons have “increase[ed] supervision within the federal
system so that no inmate-led religious groups meet without 100 percent
staff supervision.”205
However, a prison facility should not immediately remove a prisoner
from an accommodation without giving the prisoner a chance to further
demonstrate his sincerity. If a prison facility challenges the presumption of
sincerity, a prisoner should be allowed to strengthen his case by introduc-
ing relevant facts proving his sincerity. These facts could include religious
leader testimony, peer testimony of evidence of attendance of religious
ceremonies, or additional personal statements. This caveat allows room for
small lapses in strict religious adherence, understanding that all individuals
can practice imperfect sincerity.
If prison officials do not challenge the presumption of sincerity, the
court will proceed to the compelling need inquiry and make the determi-
nation of whether a prison’s policy outweighs the prisoner’s interest in the
religious accommodation.206 However, if prison officials refute the pre-
sumption of sincerity, the court proceeds to Step III of the sincerity in-
203. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 382 (1955).
204. Brady, supra note 17, at 1457.
205. Id. at 1457–58.
206. To prevail on an RLUIPA claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that a prison policy
interferes with his religious exercise, that his religious beliefs are sincere, and that the prison
policy substantially burdens his religion. After making this showing, the burden shifts to the
government to show that the policy used is the “least restrictive means of furthering that “com-
pelling government interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Thus, if a presumption of sincerity is estab-
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quiry: a totality of the circumstances test, evaluating facts and
circumstances to determine whether the prisoner is sincere in his belief.
This evidence must be strong enough to overcome the presumption of
sincerity.207
3. Step III: Determining Sincerity Under a Totality
of the Circumstances Test
Step III of the inquiry grants courts the power to resolve a prisoner’s
disputed sincerity. If a prison facility refutes the rebuttable presumption
with the necessary evidence under Step II, the court may then inquire into
facts and circumstances under a totality of the circumstances test to evalu-
ate a prisoner’s sincerity. These include consistency of belief, the timing of
the request for accommodation, inconsistent statements or conduct, relig-
ious leader testimony, and various other factors.208 These factors are
adapted from the factors utilized in the conscientious objector sincerity
tests in Witmer and Clay.209
At its core, the sincerity inquiry is a credibility determination aimed
to determine whether the inmate truly believes what he professes to be-
lieve.210 A court can look to the consistency of a prisoner’s professed belief
to determine sincerity. This may involve comparing a prisoner’s initial
statement requesting the accommodation with subsequent behavior re-
garding his professed belief. For example, if a prisoner makes an initial
request to join a Kosher meals program, but subsequently alternates be-
tween eating Kosher meals and non-Kosher meals from month to month
before a facility finally removes him from program, a court may consider
the inconsistent behavior as evidence of insincerity. Similarly, if a prisoner
is removed from a Kosher food program and fails to file a grievance or
express any outward objection to his removal from the program, a court
may consider failure to object at the time of removal and subsequent
RLUIPA claim as evidence of inconsistent conduct.211
Looking to the conscientious objector factors, there are four factors
that are particularly adaptable to the sincerity inquiry: the consistency of
the prisoner’s claims, the strength of the prisoner’s initial statement of re-
lished and the prisoner prevails on his RLUIPA claim, the court should simply proceed to
determining whether the prison policy advances a compelling government interest.
207. Brady, supra note 17, at 1458.
208. Adapted from the Witmer test. 348 U.S. at 382.
209. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the conscientious objector test).
210. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 2012), as
corrected (Feb. 20, 2013) (“We limit ourselves to ‘almost exclusively a credibility assessment’ when
determining sincerity.”).
211. See id. at 791–92.
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quest for an accommodation, delay in asserting conscientious objector sta-
tus, and religious leader testimony.212
Courts may consider the inmate’s statement of request for the relig-
ious accommodation or statements explaining circumstances surrounding
the request. In Wall v. Wade, a prison facility required a Muslim inmate to
provide physical proof, such as a Quran or prayer rug, that he was Mus-
lim.213 The prisoner stated that he had no physical indicia of proof because
he had lost all of his belongings when he was transferred to a new facil-
ity.214 Although the prisoner prevailed in this case due to the unconstitu-
tionality of the prison’s policy requiring physical proof of religiosity,215
such statements explaining sincerity or insincerity should be taken into
account when there is uncertainty.
Courts may also consider the timing of a prisoner’s request for an
accommodation, but the timing of the request should not be dispositive of
sincerity or insincerity.216 Where a prisoner does not assert an expression
of belief until it is clear he will gain an advantageous accommodation, a
court may consider timing as evidence of insincerity.217 For example, if a
prisoner switches his religion to Judaism only after a prison facility begins
to offer Kosher meals, a court may consider this as evidence of insincerity.
However, timing of a request must be considered in conjunction with
other evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of sincerity.
Courts may also consider religious leader testimony presented by ei-
ther party. Prison chaplains are in the unique position of interacting with
prisoners on a frequent basis, and may be able to provide valuable evidence
about a prisoner’s sincerity. Chaplains often witness a prisoner’s daily ex-
ercises in practicing his or her religion and can express an opinion about a
prisoner’s sincerity. Courts may consider a chaplain’s testimony in con-
junction with other presented evidence.
However, courts may not consider lapses in adherence to doctrinal
teachings as evidence of insincerity. If a prisoner requests Kosher food but
lapses and eats food from the commissary occasionally, the court should
not take this fact to be determinative of insincerity of belief in eating Ko-
sher food. If courts looked to lapses in adherence as evidence of sincerity,
prisoners would be held to a higher standard of religious adherence than
other citizens, thereby contradicting RLUIPA’s intent. Furthermore, there
are ample reasons why a prisoner may want to keep kosher food for main
212. This is not an all-inclusive list, but is meant to serve as an example of factors courts
should consider.
213. Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 494 (4th Cir. 2014).
214. Id. at 495.
215. Id. at 501–02.
216. See Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 703 (1971).
217. See id. at 702 (“[A] registrant has not shown overt manifestations sufficient to estab-
lish his subjective belief where, as here, his conscientious-objector claim was not asserted until
military service became imminent.”).
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meals and not for other meals. A prisoner may be struggling with the diffi-
culty of keeping Kosher meals, but still have a sincere desire to better his
Jewish faith. People also have varying degrees to which they adhere Kosher
dietary restrictions. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, “[A] sincere religious
believer doesn’t forfeit his religious rights merely because he is not scrupu-
lous in his observance; for where would religion be without its backsliders,
penitents, and prodigal sons?”218
When considering additional facts, courts must refrain from any in-
quiries into whether practices are central to or mandated by a religion.
Courts must also refrain from evaluating whether a prisoner’s conduct
conforms to his religion’s teachings. In Benning v. Georgia, a prison facility
denied a prisoner’s request to grow earlocks because the facility deter-
mined that the prisoner failed to establish that he was Jewish in accordance
with the laws of Judaism. The prison provided the testimony of a Rabbi,
stating, “Judaism does not allow one to convert simply by declaring him/
herself to be Jewish.”219 The District Court properly overruled the prison
facility’s argument and declared that the sincerity question is not an “ec-
clesiastical question” of “whether he is in fact a Jew under Judaic Law.”220
It would be burdensome to require prison facilities to provide chaplains for
each and every sect for a religion and to pass judgments on religious doc-
trinal questions.221 Even if prison facilities were equipped to make such
determinations, they would be violating the underlying intent of the
sincerity inquiry. The sincerity inquiry is a credibility inquiry that asks
whether the inmate believes what he professes to believe.222 This inquiry
should simply question whether the inmate’s conduct conforms to his pro-
fessed statements, not whether it conforms to the doctrinal underpinnings
of the religion.
C. Why Standardize the Sincerity Inquiry?
Standardizing the sincerity inquiry would remain faithful to
RLUIPA’s text.223 The test places the burden of establishing a nexus be-
tween the requested accommodation and the religious belief on the pris-
oner, rather than the courts. Courts are involved in evaluating the sincerity
of the prisoner’s claims only when it is disputed by the prisoner facility and
when a facility presents affirmative evidence to the contrary. Thus, this test
218. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781, 791–92 (5th Cir. 2012), as
corrected (Feb. 20, 2013) (citing Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2012)).
219. Benning v. Georgia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1378 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
220. Id. (citing Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 321 (2d Cir.1999).
221. See MICH. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, POLICY DIRECTIVE, 5.03.150 (July 2013), avail-
able at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/05_03_150_429021_7.pdf (“The
Correctional Facilities Administration (CFA) Special Activities Coordinator shall be a member of
the CAC and ensure that all major religions are represented.”).
222. Moussazadeh, 703 F.3d at 792, as corrected (Feb. 20, 2013).
223. See discussion supra, Part II.
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creates a practical, administrable, and predictable test for courts to deter-
mine a prisoner’s sincerity of religious belief.
The standardized sincerity inquiry also adheres to prior court inter-
pretations of the sincerity test. In Witmer, the Court adopted a presump-
tion of sincerity after the claimant presented a statement of his religious
belief and conscientious objector status.224 By presuming sincerity after the
prisoner makes the requisite showing, the courts are approaching the
sincerity inquiry with a “light touch” and refraining from heavily involv-
ing themselves in passing determinations on doctrinal teachings of a pris-
oner’s religion.225
In addition, a standardized sincerity test is preferable to a centrality
test because it allows courts to determine a substantial burden without in-
quiring into the centrality of a prisoner’s requested accommodation.226
After determining sincerity, courts can then evaluate the extent to which a
prisoner is substantially burdened in his religious belief. The three-part
sincerity inquiry is also preferable to the court approach of allowing pris-
oners to easily prevail on their prima facie RLUIPA claims because it elim-
inates feigning practitioner’s RLUIPA claims before they reach the
compelling need inquiry.227 As a result, the standardized three-part sincer-
ity inquiry prevents courts from loosening the standard for strict
scrutiny.228
Furthermore, the three-part inquiry could decrease litigation costs
for both parties by notifying the parties of the relevant factors in determin-
ing sincerity prior to litigation. The three-part inquiry puts prisoners on
notice of what factors will be considered in the evaluation of their
RLUIPA claims for religious accommodation. If prisoners are aware that a
court will scrupulously examine evidence of their past inconsistent state-
ments or conduct, insincere practitioners will likely be discouraged from
litigating claims arising from a desire to gain more comfortable religious
accommodations. Prisoners will also be put on notice that the timing of
their request for a religious accommodation, as well as a chaplain’s testi-
mony, will be relevant to their assessment for sincerity.229
The test would be beneficial to all parties. It is in a prison facility’s
interest to formulate constitutional policies that will be upheld at the dis-
trict court and appellate court levels. Prisons would also be discouraged
224. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 382 (1955).
225. See Moussazadeh, 703 F.3d at 792, as corrected (Feb. 20, 2013).
226. See McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 577 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Without some relig-
ious framework, claims such as McFaul’s would open the door to finding that any inmate’s
assertion constitutes a sincerely held religious belief and that any limitation on that belief consti-
tutes a substantial burden on the practice of his religion. See Smith, 502 F.3d at 1278. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the dismissal of the RLUIPA and TRFRA claims.”) (internal citations omitted).
227. See supra Part I.B (discussing the steps for filing an RLUIPA claim).
228. See supra Part II.C-D (discussing The Hard Look and Deferential Models).
229. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
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from using unconstitutional sincerity inquiries if they are aware such in-
quiries will be overturned on review. A standardized inquiry puts prison
administrators on notice of constitutional policies so that administrators
can operationalize the three-part inquiry into a practical directive.
Lastly, a standardized inquiry will permit courts to resolve RLUIPA
cases more efficiently. If courts apply the same three-part inquiry, courts
would be able to resolve them at the first stage of litigation, and as a result,
parties would be discouraged from appealing their cases.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the goal of legislations such as RFRA and RLUIPA is to
keep religion in prisons because religion is “one of the best rehabilitative
influences we can have.230 As Senator Orrin Hatch, one of the original
sponsors of RFRA declared, “Just because they are prisoners does not
mean all of their rights should go down the drain.”231 RLUIPA solidified
Supreme Court jurisprudence prohibiting courts from inquiring into the
centrality of religious belief.232 In response to RLUIPA and in an attempt
to distinguish the feigning practitioners from the sincere believers, prison
facilities implemented sincerity tests. These sincerity tests, however, have
proved difficult to administer effectively. Prison facilities implemented ar-
bitrary and unconstitutional sincerity tests, such as requiring prisoners to
provide physical evidence of religiosity, or by removing lapsing prisoners
from accommodation programs. Courts frequently overturned prison poli-
cies on review, but remained unable to standardize the sincerity inquiry.
Due to the difficulty of determining sincerity, courts responded to
RLUIPA in two ways that both failed to adhere to the text of RLUIPA.
This Note’s proposal of a third approach to the problem, a three-part test
to determine sincerity of religious belief, would significantly improve pris-
ons facilities’ determination of sincerity and consistency in the courts on
this issue. By fairly and constitutionally inquiring into sincerity of religious
belief, courts and prisons can ease the difficulty of weeding out insincere
prisoners, while adhering to RLUIPA’s original text and intent.
230. Solove, supra note 31, at 459 (citing 139 Cong. Rec. S14, 367 (Daily Ed. Oct. 26,
1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch)).
231. Id.
232. 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1 (2006); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (hold-
ing that the Act, which “defines ‘religious exercise’ to include ‘any exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief’” does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause).
